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The chapter deals with migration challenges, a burning topic crucial for both the 
EU and the world. Hereby, public diplomacy tools are of huge interest as a factor 
influencing social and cultural space sustainability, especially, of cross-border 
territories. This chapter deals with complex studies of the Finnish case particularly 
migrants’ inclusion analysis into local cultural and political environments as well 
as public diplomacy impact evaluation of an important “soft power” tool where 
migrants’ role is rather high. The research method of migrants as a “soft power” 
is based upon interviews, which result in respondents’ typology development; 
political information channels were defined; and the influence of education and 
social inclusion upon political communication was characterized. The resulting 
characteristics of migrants’ political communication might be of high interest in 
terms of migration policy regulation and understanding the issue of migration 
quotas and help to predict structural changes in society and also to provide the 
basis for making decisions on the effective use of public diplomacy tools. At the 
same time, we believe that via public diplomacy tools it is necessary to rely on not 
only separate national cultural aspects but also the whole civilizational image-the 
so-called nation’s gestalt.
Keywords: public diplomacy, cooperation, Finland, Karelia, Russian diaspora, 
social and cultural space
1. Introduction
Public diplomacy role has been growing in recent decades. Undoubtedly, public 
diplomacy strengthens sociocultural cooperation, good neighborliness and an 
atmosphere of security and serves as a tool of “soft power” that increases region/
country attractiveness, language, culture and lifestyle. Means of “soft power” were 
interpreted by J. Nye [1, 2] as a process of achieving strategic interests by a state 
via positive attitude development in other states’ society and its goals achieving 
through attractiveness. Active communication influences international life nature 
since it is determined by both beliefs and expectations that people have and that are 
established by social rather than material structures [3].
“Soft power” is presented with media, by educational organizations (operating 
in a framework of international cultural and educational programs), as well as by 




Soft power tools are also witnessed in Russian communications. It has become an 
integral component of modern international politics in Russia as a comprehensive 
toolkit for solving foreign policy issues based on civil society demands, informa-
tion and communication, humanitarian and other alternative classical diplomacy 
methods and technologies [4]. Moreover, Russia has enormous potential for public 
diplomacy development. It’s most important pillar is presented with a so-called 
Russian world when millions of people abroad feel a strong need to keep in touch 
with Russia, Russian language and its culture [5].
2. Migration challenge
Soft power is important not only because of its influence on a sociocultural space 
but also because of increase in anthropogenic mobiles (moving people), which 
today are considered a tool of geopolitics.
We also consider migration challenge and associated use of soft power tools that 
cause disturbances in social ecology.
In 2017, the number of migrants reached 258 million people. Over the past 
17 years, the total number of migrants has increased from 173 million by 49% 
according to the International Migration Report [6]. The growth of migrants’ 
mobility and the impact of migration flows on almost all countries’ development 
include the international migration issue.
Migration processes are dependent on a structure of social relations and cannot 
be studied in isolation from various social, economic and political phenomena in 
which they occur (according to a modern theory of migration considered from a 
geographical point of view [7]).
Migrants’ studies (including surveys) are highly important in terms of migration 
policy analysis in the European countries. They are performing migrants’ surveys 
regularly for accessing migrants’ living conditions, political preferences, etc. The 
best foreign practice has shown that migrants’ studies are highly important in terms 
of society’s structural changes projection.
Migrants not only affect population dynamics, changing its structure, but also to 
some extent influence local community life: the larger the proportion of migrants, 
the greater their impact on the local community.
In order to obtain up-to-date information on both state and sociocultural 
perspectives, a competent migration policy development is highly necessary taking 
into account different aspects of globalization phenomenon.
Therefore, it is necessary to research migrants’ inclusion mechanisms in local 
cultural and political environment as a condition for sociocultural sustainability as 
well as public diplomacy as the most important “soft power” tool where migrants’ 
role is rather high.
Europe remains migrants’ most attractive region. Largest migrant groups consist 
mostly of people coming from the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, migra-
tion is being characterized with irregularity: migrants’ distribution across Europe 
can be characterized with both low and high concentrations. Rather different 
situation is being witnessed in Northern Europe.
Increase in both migrants’ flows and a concentration reduces naturally the share 
of a recipient community: there is a significant increase of Arab origin population 
in France, of Turkish-Arab origin in Germany and of Indopakistan and Arab origin 
in the UK.
Hereby, we apply the Pareto rule in order both to analyze and evaluate influ-
encing factor effectiveness. Migrants’ excess of over 20% is known as a threshold 
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after which sociocultural relation structure changes significantly. The interval 
amounting to “10–20%” is a transition zone. It shows migrants’ increasing influ-
ence till a critical value. This is not an exact criterion, but rather a mnemonic 
rule that identifies an important meaning, namely a serious shift in a social 
environment.
Figures 1–5 provide data for various European countries and regions [6].
Figure 1. 
Foreign migrants as a percentage of total population of Europe.
Figure 2. 
Foreign migrants as a percentage of total population of Northern Europe.
Figure 3. 
Foreign migrants as a percentage of total population of Eastern Europe.
Figure 4. 
Foreign migrants as a percentage of total population of Southern Europe.
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There are three groups of countries to be shaped based upon Figures 1–5 
mentioned above. The first group of countries is without any significant migration 
challenges (migrants make up less than 10% of the recipient community in Finland 
and Central Eastern Europe), the second group, where migration challenges are 
pretty visible (migrants make up 10–15% in Croatia, Spain, Slovenia, Iceland and 
Denmark) and a third group, where migration challenges are highly critical (more 
than 15% of migrants in Germany, Sweden, Ireland, Austria and Norway).
The figures show that serious difficulties in trend preserving are being 
witnessed in Western and Northern Europe (in accordance with Pareto rule), 
while Northern Europe alongside with Southern Europe is showing much higher 
migrants’ growth rates.
These circumstances shall be taken into account, since soft power becomes an 
instrument not only for migrants’ integration but also for mutual influence on 
representatives’ identity coming from different cultures.
Finland stands out quite separately out of a number of some other Northern 
Europe countries, which is undoubtedly an interest for research. Finland borders 
with Russia possessing a large diaspora of the Russian-speaking population (29,000 
people), which turns out to be a serious public diplomacy resource in promoting 
“Russian world” abroad. Migration policy in Finland is considered to be highly 
adaptive and balanced, primarily preserving national interests and human capital. 
While analyzing reasons for Finland’s success, we are highlighting the main aspects: 
high human capital quality of foreign migrants coming to Finland, successful 
information dissemination for migrants coming to Finland and successful migrants’ 
integration in a Finnish labor market.
3. Regional dimension: Karelia and Finland
Public diplomacy has a regional dimension as well. It also acquires special signifi-
cance in terms of border areas, where it is necessary to maintain a climate of trust and 
stable international relations and use neighborhood for a balanced sociocultural devel-
opment of its territories. Cross-border mobility and active communication practices 
are transforming sociocultural space of border areas [8, 9]. It transforms in terms of an 
increase in a number of border crossings, contacts between people and joint actions; 
its structure becomes diverse, open to interaction and adoption of social innovations.
The European vector of public diplomacy is represented with a large number of 
NGOs and a wide range of opportunities coming from the European Union (edu-
cational programs, Northern Dimension partnerships, cross-border cooperation 
programs, etc.) [10]. Public organizations represent different sectors of population 
interests in a social and cultural space in order to achieve social, charitable, cultural, 
educational, political, scientific and managerial goals.
Figure 5. 
Foreign migrants as a percentage of total population of Western Europe.
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Since 1996, Russia and Finland have been participating in regional cross-border 
cooperation programs actively. In 2000, the Karelia Euroregion was founded 
combining the Republic of Karelia of the Russian Federation and the Finnish border 
provinces of Kainuu, North Karelia and Northern Ostrobothnia. The Republic of 
Karelia has adopted a regional cross-border cooperation program-a response to 
cross-border initiatives of the European Union, in particular, the Interreg IIIB and 
Interreg IIIA programs (including the Interreg IIIA-Karelia subprogram). The role 
of an effective platform for discussing initiatives and coordinating plans for cross-
border cooperation programs is presented by the Karelia Euroregion. Cross-border 
and multilateral cooperation programs are unique tools for developing local and 
regional territorial initiatives. For over 5 years of the program’s implementation, 66 
projects were implemented amounting to 42 million euros, 30% of which were used 
to finance infrastructure projects including modernization of the Mäpp Värtsilä-
Niirala [10]. Such cooperation practices as a cross-border shopping tourism, joint 
projects implementation and public diplomacy are widespread here. The Karelia 
Cross-Border Cooperation Program 2014–2020 (Karelia/CBC) is ongoing currently. 
It is called upon to strengthen Russian-Finnish inter-regional cross-border coopera-
tion with the support of the Russian Federation, Finland and the European Union. 
The program is cross-border in nature and contributes to the implementation of 
strategic and thematic tasks of cross-border cooperation at the European level, as 
set out in the European Neighborhood Policy [10].
In a survey by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), four factors that are critical for the development of cross-border coopera-
tion were identified [11]. Given the current challenges, we reformulate them as 
follows: the transformation of global geospace; institutional order; institutional and 
social roots and an appropriate culture of cooperation; and identity.
At the same time, cross-border cooperation is considered as a form of population 
socialization in neighboring regions in a context of cultural diversity, a multiethnic 
community formation within transboundary spaces. Border zones are character-
ized with a specific cultural phenomena, readiness for its cultural interaction and a 
certain commonality of the world population outlook [12].
In this regard, it is necessary to apply soft power tools effectively. The latter is 
important not only because of sociocultural space sustainable development but 
also due to the increase in anthropogenic mobiles (moving people), which today 
are increasingly showing the property of a geopolitical tool and, in this regard, are 
becoming an important factor in relation to border territories affecting economy 
and social sphere.
Geopolitical challenges affect reality perception by residents of border regions 
and pose a choice of the cultural world to which they want to belong to. Modern glo-
balization processes are associated not only with economic and political processes 
but also with cultural self-identification and social relations stability structure. 
Migration flows exacerbate and actualize the issues of sociocultural characteristics 
of communities introducing a different cultural and spiritual-value component 
that could change the existing social, cultural and psychological settings of the host 
community.
Border regions interaction leads to “the interpenetration of cultures, their 
mutual enrichment, contributing to a new sociocultural cross-border space.” 
Transboundary sociocultural space is also considered as a variety of intercultural 
interactions of sociocultural practices.
At the Republic of Karelia, there are lots of attributes produced in Finnish 
language-a sociopolitical magazine “Carelia” and a monthly children’s magazine 
“Kipinä” (“Sparkle”). A number of Russian-language media are also active in 
Finland, of which the largest local Russian-language newspaper is “Spektr.” Finnish 
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language training is carried out by the Department of Baltic-Finnish Philology 
at Petrozavodsk State University, at secondary schools and preschools, as well as 
in a number of commercial centers for foreign language study. There has been a 
tendency toward an increase in the number of children learning national languages. 
In preschool educational institutions in the academic year 2017–2018, Karelian, 
Veps and Finnish languages were studied by 1166 pupils, and at schools by 6820 
pupils [8].
In North Karelia (Finland), Russian language is taught both at schools and 
higher educational institutions. In 2017, there were about 3881 foreign citizens from 
106 countries in North Karelia, of which the largest were Russians (43.2%), the next 
largest were Estonians (5.2%) and Somalis and Thais (a total of 3.8%) [13]. About 
2344 foreign citizens lived in Joensuu, of which 955 were from Russia with a total 
population of 76,067 people [14].
In the framework of cooperation with Finnish partners, permanent organizers 
of the events are the friendship societies Karelia-Finland and Finland-Russia, litera-
ture and concert programs and exhibitions, a week of Finnish cinema, and touring 
activities of creative groups. The National Theater of the Republic of Karelia is the 
only theater outside Finland where performances are staged in Finnish, Karelian 
and Russian languages.
The greatest manifestation of cross-border sociocultural specificity is observed 
in the following areas: culture and art, project activities, education, tourism and 
information space [8].
The border position of the Republic of Karelia (Russia) and North Karelia 
(Finland) contributes to everyday neighborhood practices development, new forms 
of interaction emergence based on past experience. Cross-border interaction has a 
positive effect on the development of good neighborly relations and activates local 
communities not only to create networks of cooperation and establish direct ties, 
but also to develop initiatives of local communities, increase mutual understanding, 
trust and awareness.
The increasing role of border and cross-border territories in terms of sociocul-
tural space transformation causes a significant research interest.
4.  Finnish case of migrants’ inclusion analysis into local environments: 
materials and methods
This and the following sections are devoted to comprehensive studies of the 
Finnish case [15]: migrants’ integration into local cultural and political environment 
as well as public diplomacy impact assessing an important tool of “soft power” 
where migrants’ role is quite high.
Finland is highly attractive both from the point of view of migration impact 
upon local community and taking into account multiple economic and cultural 
ties with Russia. Therefore, it is important to explore some possibilities for public 
diplomacy tools’ application using Russian diaspora resource.
Since Russian diaspora in Finland is relatively significant, its communications 
are of certain interest from the point of view of public diplomacy instruments. Soft 
power is becoming an instrument not only for cross-border cooperation develop-
ment but also for influencing identity and a serious resource of public diplomacy in 
promoting the “Russian world” abroad.
The goal is both to research on problems dealing with the Russian-speaking 
diaspora in Finland and public diplomacy tools (media analysis, social networks 
and social groups) aimed at migrants’ integration policy upgrading in local 
communities.
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Nowadays (both in Russia and in the world), the research is not devoted enough 
to migrants’ political communication. In particular, in Russia, political communi-
cation is scrutinized in the following areas: power as a political communication, 
political communication theory, sociology of political communication, psychologi-
cal aspects of political communication, information security impact on political 
communication, political communication as a way to deploy political order events; 
political communication as an independent phenomenon not as a function, but as a 
process; use of information and communication technologies [16].
Based upon a wide-known theoretical approaches in the field of migration-the 
so-called general migration theory (E. Ravenstein, Stoufer, E. Lee, etc.), we shall 
consider the Russian-speaking diaspora integrating problems in Finland as well as 
some public diplomacy tools as a soft power resource [1, 17–19].
The research is also dealing with Migrants Integration Policy Index developed 
according to Barcelona Center for International Affairs and Migration Policy Group 
[20–22]. This method embraces seven areas of migrants’ integration: labor market 
mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, 
access to nationality and antidiscrimination (according to Migrant Integration 
Policy Index). Migrant integration policy index helps us to evaluate migrants’ rights 
and well-being, analyze state migration policy and state’s responsibility, as well as 
develop recommendations on migrants’ integration policy. This article deals with 
one of the seventh integration areas in accordance with the Migrant Integration 
Policy Index-migrants’ political participation, in particular, Russian migrants’ 
political communication in Finland (our case).
The research is based upon interviews, which result in respondents’ typology 
development; political information channels were defined; and the influence of 
education and social inclusion upon political communication was characterized. 
Thus, for example, in Finland, migrants’ personal data upon age, gender, country 
of origin, immigration country, religion, marriage and date of entry are obtained 
from a variety of sources accumulated in one information system “Population 
Information System” under Statistical Agency of Finland. Information on migrants 
is accumulating from different confessions’ parishes, hospitals and the Migration 
Service of Finland. In Finland, migrants need to obtain ID card necessary for 
work or medical assistance, and for this, each migrant has to undergo a mandatory 
registration procedure in “Population Information System.” Every year, “Population 
Information System” staff are serving migrants and thus checking their residential 
address. In 2014, it turned out that 99% of migrants have the same address. Each 
month, the information system generates final reports on changes occurred for the 
last month-“Population statistics service.” At the end of each quarter, the infor-
mation system provides provisional statistics on population changes for the year 
(“Quarterly population statistics”). Statistics on migrants is published annually: in 
electronic form in May and in paper form in June of each year (“Population struc-
ture and vital statistics by municipality”).
Migrants’ surveys allow to supplement the information system data from open 
sources and are used to achieve the following objectives:
1. To access detailed information on various parameters
2. To identify migrants’ sentiments
3. To define migrant problems




The authors developed a questionnaire in order to achieve the research goal. 
The questionnaire included 30 questions and was divided into five main categories: 
political information sources, political dialog, use of sources of information through 
the Internet, political participation and social status. Secondary questions were 
related to international news, national government, economic news, community 
events, and editorial columns of the local news.
Official statistics both of the UN and national states is widely applied [6, 23]. 
Migrants’ survey is the most important tool that allows to identify structural 
changes in society and to evaluate reasons for these changes [24]. Migrants’ surveys 
allow to supplement and provide more detailed information on statistics obtained 
from public information sources.
5. Research results
Among Northern Europe countries, Finland is of great interest as a neighbor-
ing country having a large number of migrants from Russia and as a country that 
pursues a successful migration policy aimed at local community sustainability. 
Finland’s Future of Migration 2020 Strategy has been recently adopted and 
announces the following principles [25]:
• Diversity will be valued as Finland’s internationalization continues.
• Equality and equal opportunities will apply to everyone.
• Migration will enhance the well-being of the population and boost Finland’s 
competitiveness.
• Migrants will be able to use their skills and contribute to the future develop-
ment of society.
• Migration will be foreseeable and controlled.
Starting from January 1, 2015, an updated Finnish Non-Discrimination Act came 
into force authorizing the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman [26]. Nowadays, in 
Finland, there are Non-Discrimination Ombudsman, Equality Ombudsman and 
Ombudsman for Children; all three institutions are also aimed at migration policy 
regulation.
According to Statistics Finland, Russians were the largest migration group till 
2010 (29,500) [27]. For the last several years, the situation has changed. Russians 
(29,800) are the second largest group after Estonians (38,000). Today, migra-
tion flow in Finland is mainly represented with two largest groups of migrants: 
49% of Estonians and 39% of Russians according to International Migration 
Outlook [28].
For the last 5 years (2010–2015), migration outflow has dried out from Russia 
to Finland. For a long period starting from 1990s till 2010 (about 20 years), basic 
reasons for active labor migration in Finland were the following: Inkeri Finns repa-
triation, international marriages and refugees. However, currently, Finnish immi-
gration policy is changing drastically-foreign labor migration flows from Russia 
are significantly reducing. One of the basic reasons is that Finnish Government has 
fully stopped Inkeri Finns repatriation from Russia starting from July 1, 2011. As a 
result, Finnish migration policy has changed significantly.
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Currently, Russian diaspora in Finland is not studied well though, especially 
Russian migrants’ peculiar political communication traits. In this term, these 
characteristics are highly valuable from the point of view of migration policy 
regulation.
Russian migrants are the second largest group of migrants in Finland influenc-
ing potentially the political process. Here, we have in mind that Russian migrants 
in Finland have a very strong instrument of influence-right to vote at municipal 
elections. According to the Finnish law-the Election Act [29]-any citizen of any 
state has a right to take part in municipal elections. There are however additional 
two conditions such as the living status in the municipality in which the vote is held 
(at least 51 days before election day) and staying in Finland for at least 2 years.
Let us consider Russian migrants’ living in Finland survey results in order to 
identify their political communication characteristics. The research of Russian 
migrants organized in Finland is a qualitative one and allows to both develop and 
prepare based on the more in-depth study. The aim of the research is to identify 
Russian migrants’ relations with politics.
In general, 122 respondents took part in interviews. No doubt the obtained 
data demand further approval by quantitative data, but this research is mainly 
qualitative and aimed at analyzing interaction of the target group with an ambient 
environment.
Respondents were selected in accordance with the snowball effect. The respon-
dent profile is presented with a Russian migrant living in Finland for more than 
3 years, of Russian nationality, and of full legal age. Age, education level and 
income level were not taken into consideration. The interview also revealed some 
additional characteristics of the sample.
After the interview, it became clear that 45% of respondents were not inter-
ested in politics (“idle respondents”); 45% who became “active respondents” were 
actively using political communication channels [media, social networks, Internet, 
TV and social circles (family and job)]. About 10% of respondents were rather 
negative toward politics (“blocking respondents”): “I am interested only in my close 
people; I do not see any reason to spend my time on politics.” About 13% of respon-
dents participated in municipal voting. Finnish law is ensuring migrants’ participa-
tion in municipal elections-“for those migrants who live at least 2 years in Finland 
and at least 51 days in the commune in order to involve them in the processes of 
integration” according to Election Act.
The most popular expression that served as a motive for respondents’ typology 
was “try to follow up all the news.” Thus, the respondents ranged from actively 
watching political events “to be in the swim” to never participating in elections, 
signing/creating petitions “because that doesn’t help,” and never be interested in 
news but participating in elections “of course it’s my duty, I have to vote” or “it is 
necessary to do something, chose if you remain silent this will happen all the time.” 
In summary, three main types of respondents could be identified based upon their 
interest in politics: active, idle and blocking.
Active respondent: Most active respondents have aspiration to compare differ-
ent sources of information, interest in politics of both Finland and Russia, as well 
as international and local political issues. Those, whose interest in political issues is 
high, can be divided into two further groups:
• Those who actually like to discuss politics with peers
• Those who are actively looking for political news but they are not that open to 
discussions and consider this knowledge only for their personal development
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Moreover, willingness to compare different sources of information often cor-
relates with higher education.
Idle respondents are those who would listen about political issues in the general 
daily news flow but would not try to find information about political topics them-
selves. They would listen to political discussion and even might slightly participate 
in it but would not initiate it themselves. Politics for them is a parallel world in 
which they never seek to interfere, but always watch how it changes.
Blocking respondent: Mentioning politics brings negative emotions to members 
of this group. They generally have a skeptic approach toward political affairs. They 
would not participate in political discussions and would try to avoid them.
Thus, respondents’ answers gave us an opportunity to categorize migrants in 
accordance with the above-mentioned types and also to allocate channels of politi-
cal information for migrants.
Four main channels of receiving political information by Russian migrants in 
Finland-Internet, TV, newspapers and social circles-were outlined. It should be 
noted that information obtained by Russian migrants living in Finland is performed 
through a wide range of channels. However, another peculiar feature should also 
be mentioned. Thus, for some respondents who do not know Finnish language or 
possess low knowledge of it, it is difficult to access news in Finnish. Despite this, 
it is still believed that the most favorable conditions for migrants are established 
in Finland, which is actively working on migrants’ integration including Russian 
migrants also.
This is also proved by a wide range of news presented in Russian, for 
example, Internet news resources “YLE” and “Spectrum,” information portals 
“Russian.fi,” “Fontanka.fi” and “Russian Finland,” and radio news in Russian 
language-“Sputnik.”
Thus, the variety of sources from which the respondents received information 
on political events is reduced to the following basic four channels:
1. Newspapers (both printed and electronic) are divided into three groups
• Russian newspapers: “Novaya gazeta,” “Argumenty I facty” and “Snob”
• Finnish daily newspaper “Aamulehti” (second popular newspaper in 
Finland after “HelsinkinSanomat” and “TurunSanomat”)
• Finnish resources in Russian language “Spector” и “YLE”
2. Television-respondents prefer watching Russian channels such as ORT, NTV, 
RTR, TNT, Channel 5 and the channel “Spas.” Respondents particularly noted 
such political programs browsing as “K Bariery” on RTR channel and “Pyater-
kapoekonomike” on “Spas” channel.
3. Internet sources used by respondents in order to learn political news are 
Newsru.com, Yandex.ru, Euronews, Facebook, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki.
4. Small groups-another popular method of respondents’ political communica-
tion with coworkers and family members.
Migrants’ survey results draw the following conclusion: newspapers (in elec-
tronic and printed form) were used by active and idle respondents. There is also a 
study outlining that newspaper reading and participation in discussions motivate 
to participate in political activities [30]. At the same time, it prevents from viewing 
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entertainment television programs. Thus, according to the results, people with 
higher interest in political events prefer to read newspapers and analytical articles, 
but refuse to participate in any political activity. Those who prefer TV programs to 
newspapers are trying to participate in the elections.
Different channels’ influence on political communication intensity was also 
studied.
Frequency of turning to different information sources (number of days per year 
when sources were viewed in relation with the total number of days) was used as 
an indicator characterizing migrants’ political communication intensity. Thus, “1” 
is presented as a maximum (daily frequency) and minimum is corresponding to 
“0.03,” which is several times per year.
Figure 6 shows the mean intensity of migrants’ political communication 
depending on the type of source.
It is visible from Figure 6 that political communication is getting more intensive 
when a migrant gets information from newspapers. In part, this might be due to 
the predominant position of Finnish newspapers that usually publish many details 
on municipality/city life in Finland. The second place goes to TV and the third to 
Internet.
Migrants’ survey results showed that migrants’ political communication evalua-
tion is highly important since it allows to identify the underlying trends in political 
preferences, to obtain information for a rapid response in certain cases as well as 
identify areas where migrants need support or assistance.
6. Discussion
The chapter analyzed the interaction of the target group with ambient environ-
ment, and cause-and-effect relationship together with factors influencing respon-
dents’ behavior is outlined.
According to the study of Mutz and Mondak [31], the most likely place for 
the policy debate is a working place. However, data obtained under the interview 
indicate that the situation has some limitations for Russian migrants in Finland. In 
the workplace, both in mixed teams (with Russian and Finnish colleagues) and in 
teams where only Russian migrants work, there are some discussions on political 
topics. Colleagues discuss political events not only in Russia and Finland but also 
on international arena; however, in companies with international staff, political 
themes often get avoided.
Figure 6. 
Political communication intensity of Russian migrants in Finland based upon information channels.
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The probability of discussion upon conflicting topics is much higher within the 
family members, since the level of trust is high. In the workplace, employees often 
prefer to avoid such issues, though it is not an absolute rule, and if there’s trusting 
relationship between colleagues, it is quite possible to exchange opinions.
Under the interview, it was also defined that the role of small groups has an 
impact on Russian migrants’ political communication in Finland.
Under the interview, the correlation between level of integration into the host 
society and choice of an interesting event in Russian and Finnish societies was 
found. For example, young migrants (students and young migrants in a labor 
market), who grew up in Finland and are fluent in Finnish language, have a higher 
degree of social inclusion, which allows them to understand more easily what is 
happening in the political arena.
Senior migrants often lack language skills and socialization experience in the 
new society (no work and no new education) and often prefer to concentrate 
on Russian political events, obtaining information mainly from Russian media. 
However, this is not a widespread rule. In Finland, there are Russian migrants who 
are active in the preretirement and retirement age. They continue to familiarize 
themselves with the host society and to stay up to date with its main events. For 
some Russian migrants, Finnish news daily newspaper “Aamulehti” is the main 
source of information, and they read it, even if they have to use the dictionary 
constantly.
Migrants’ survey results confirmed previously identified relationship between 
the level of education and breadth of political interests (see [32, 33]) and have 
showed that migrants with higher education seek to educate a wider range of 
political topics. They used a wider range of information, including analytical 
programs and magazines. These respondents refer to news critically and compare 
news from various sources. The results of conducted migrants’ interviews con-
firm this relationship again. Thus, “active” respondents with higher education 
are more eager to talk about information analysis from different (or even multi-
lingual) sources (“I compare information from different sources, in particular, 
the Finnish sources-YLE, Russian news channels in Internet, British sources, then 
I can Skype with my friends and ask how it is in reality.”). Thus, the analysis of 
a wide range of news gives a clearer picture of the situation in a political world 
and can provide a more solid basis for political communication and political 
 participation later.
The research also proved the fact that migrants’ social inclusion into host society 
is highly dependent on language knowledge. For confirmation of the hypothesis, 
a causal analysis of the social inclusion impact upon political communication 
intensity was conducted. As an indicator, which characterizes Russian migrants’ 
social inclusion, we use factor of foreign languages’ knowledge, including Finnish 
and English. The final indicator for political communication intensity became the 
frequency of interaction with information sources (access to Internet sources, read-
ing newspapers, watching TV, small group discussion, etc).
Knowledge of Russian language is accepted as a minimum factor of migrants’ 
social inclusion. Knowledge of one foreign language (English or Finnish) correlated 
to average value of migrants’ social inclusion. The maximum value of the factor is 
the knowledge of two or more foreign languages.
Figure 7 below shows migrants’ political communication intensity depending on 
foreign language knowledge.
Figure 7 shows that migrants’ political communication intensity is higher if a 
migrant knows one or more foreign languages; accordingly, he/she has an opportu-
nity to get acquainted with a wide range of multilingual sources.
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These results confirm the theory of Sotirovich and McLeod [30] that: 
“Education provides both knowledge and skills to work with information, and 
therefore, improves access to political process, at least, makes political participation 
more likely.”
The survey results have showed that workers with higher education, in general, 
seek to familiarize with a wide spectrum of political topics and thus analyze events 
critically (see also [34]).
It is worth noting that research has proved the fact that migrants’ social inclu-
sion into society is heavily dependent upon foreign language skills. The following 
characteristics of migrants’ political communication were outlined as a result of 
survey data processing:
• Respondents are distributed according to the following types of political com-
munication: “active”—45%; “idle”—45% and “blocking”—10%.
• Relationship is found between the level of education and both quantity and 
quality of media sources accessed by respondents; for example, only migrants 
with higher education accessed analytical journals.
• Positive correlation between the number of foreign languages and migrants’ 
political communication intensity is found.
• The following priorities for the use of political information sources among 
migrants are identified: Internet, 64%; TV, 45%; newspapers, 27%; and small 
groups, 18%.
• The impact of various information channels on political communication 
intensity of Russian immigrants in Finland is estimated.
• The role of small groups in migrants’ political communication is discovered.
So, at the workplace and, in particular, in companies with an international team, 
despite the presence of small groups (colleagues), political topics are shot out by 
tolerant reasons. On the contrary, political situation is discussed more frequently 
within the family.
Figure 7. 




Complex studies of the Finnish case were dealing with migrants’ inclusion into 
local cultural and political environments (as conditions to cultural and political 
environment stability) as well as public diplomacy evaluation of an important “soft 
power” tool where migrants’ role is rather high.
In this research, we have investigated some unknown features of Russian 
migrants’ political communication in Finland. We have identified some characteris-
tics of political communication by applying the interview method. The main factors 
that would influence interpersonal communication in politics among Russian 
migrants in Finland are explored.
Theoretically, the research allowed both analyzing such an important aspect 
of migration policy as migrants’ political communication and identifying its key 
features.
Interviews with migrants helped to understand the mechanism between political 
communications and shifts in local society.
The resulting characteristics of migrants’ political communication might be of 
high interest in terms of migration policy regulation and understanding the issue 
of migration quotas. The findings would also help to predict structural changes in 
society, to assess the level of radicalization in society and to provide the basis for 
decision-making on effective use of public diplomacy tools. The growth of anthro-
pogenic mobiles (movement of people and influence of cultures) is a phenomenon 
with many security contexts: it aggravates interethnic and interreligious contradic-
tions between different ethnocultural groups of the population, increases social 
tension and defragments local community through ethnic enclaves’ formation.
Sociocultural space is considered to be an area of culture, norms and values, 
cross-cultural interactions. It is important to understand how ethnic group (subeth-
nic group and local community) is able to maintain homeostasis in social relations 
structure and its recognizable ethnocultural profile-a kind of gestalt. This term 
undermines as a “structure,” “image,” “form” and “integrity.”
Thus, we have not just a certain sum of social relations but some kind of stable 
semantic and visual constructions, a contour made up of identity markers-the 
“gravity center” for the Russian world gestalt.
A debatable question thus arises: how stable these semantic constructions are 
and how a subethnos that is a subject both to external and internal factors is able 
to maintain its “gestalt”? In a paper [35], a number of reasons listed to upset social 
relations structure in relation to other ethnocultural groups/religions and united 
by a single cultural code are presented by the example of Karelia. By virtue of 
its genesis, this core has not only a solid fundamental (invariant) part but also a 
variable part that evolves under the influence of various factors. Invariants (empiri-
cally measured identification features that remain relatively unchanged in tem-
poral and spatial dimensions) and inversions of sociocultural space are revealed. 
In particular, Protestant, Catholic and Muslim inversions were identified in a 
sociocultural landscape of Karelia, where the Orthodox Christian faith dominates 
overwhelmingly.
In conclusion, we came up with the main two principal results.
Firstly, identity factors together with cooperation culture are critical (in rela-
tion to border area development). It is necessary to promote consolidation of local 
community in Russian ideological spirit and its cultural codes expansion given that 
the cooperation development leads to local communities’ consolidation within the 
framework of cross-border structures in changing geopolitical conditions in order 
to protect national interests.
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In this regard, soft power tools’ application is important. Promotion of markers, 
in our opinion, is of public diplomacy. Its task is the development of the civiliza-
tional cultural code “Russian world” (people get a whole attractive civilizational 
image of the Russian world).
The basis of this thesis is the assertion that we cannot perceive the world around 
us directly-a person always interacts in a communication process.
Thus, social communication, on one hand, is a conscious, targeted and appro-
priate informational impact on partners, which can be either an individual person 
or groups of people who participate, or are going to participate in joint activities. On 
the other hand, it is a complex multifaceted process of establishing and developing 
contacts between people, connecting people not only with the information transfer 
but also with practical actions, elements of mutual understanding, feelings and 
emotions. Therefore, from political communications analysis, it follows that gestalt 
transmission requires the following elements for a communication diplomacy 
model: (1) a generator (encodes a semantic or visual construction); (2) message 
translator-translates encoded information; (3) channel-means of transmitting 
information; and (4) recipient-a person to whom the information is intended and 
who decodes it in a given sense.
Secondly, the border appears to be such kind of a zone where the development 
vector is aimed at economic and cultural space communications. At the same time, 
the border is not only a zone of cross-cultural communications but also of institu-
tional matrices’ conjugation where communications are carried out.
Currently, more than 160 Russian municipalities are partnering with more than 
750 foreign local territories. At the same time, communication is being built in not 
a very convenient multiformat with different institutions, powers and partners 
functioning. Therefore, on the basis of cross-border interaction studies, it was 
concluded that in order to unify the procedure for local authorities to implement 
cross-border relations it is advisable to harmonize regulatory institutions and 
use public diplomacy tools to promote cultural code and organize effective cross-
cultural communications.
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